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On Alan Goldman’s Philosophy and the Novel

by Richard Eldridge

I

t is worth at least a moment to note and praise Alan Goldman’s
methodological stance in Philosophy and the Novel.1 Goldman reflects
appreciatively on the achievements of specific novels in order to arrive
at philosophically interesting results about interpretation and moral
understanding. In his appreciative reflections, Goldman is aware of,
but by no means bound by, recent work in experimental moral psychology (for example, arguments against the existence of character) and
metaethics (for example, standard realism/antirealism debates). The
result is a powerful demonstration not only of the human, cognitive,
and ethical interest of the novel but also of the ability of the novel to
inform and transform our thinking about psychology and ethics.
Part 1, titled “Philosophy of Novels,” argues for claims about interpretation. Two main theses are prominent:
1) “Interpreting novels aims at appreciating their value” (p. 21).
2) A work distinctively possesses aesthetic value when, and only when, it
invites and sustains “the full and interactive exercise of our . . . perceptual, imaginative, emotional, and cognitive . . . capacities” (p. 3).

In developing this second thesis, Goldman draws on his earlier account
of aesthetic value in his 1995 book, Aesthetic Value. Goldman’s general
view about value is broadly Aristotelian: distinctive values attach to distinctive kinds of activity that we enjoy. In reading novels in particular, or
at least clearly successful ones, we engage with and enjoy their “perfect
union[s] of form and content, grasped through imagination, feeling,
Philosophy and Literature, 2015, 39: 564–574. © 2016 The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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and thought operating together” (p. 6). As these mentions of form,
content, imagination, feeling, and thought indicate, Kant, Dewey, and
Beardsley are also among this book’s pantheon of heroes in considering literary art.
Interpreting novels, then, is not simply a matter of semantic decoding. Nor is interpretation directed exclusively or primarily either to
authorial intention “behind” the work or to formal properties detached
from expressive or semantic significance. Any “thematic theses” must,
if a work is “to be of literary value, . . . be embodied or woven into [its]
narrative, characterization, and even setting, formal structure, and prose
style” (p. 7). Both authors and readers know this, and their manners of
production and reception are attuned to this requirement, at least in
cases of successful writing and reading.
The interpretation of novels as works of literary art functions, then,
as a kind of reverse engineering of what has been successfully achieved
within the work, in analytically distinguishing the elements through
which the job of embodying literary value has been done. Interpretation
selects properties and guides attention to the appreciation of value (p.
23). It “aims at understanding and appreciation” (p. 24). As a kind of
“inference to the best explanation” of how the task of producing a valuable, appreciatable literary object has been carried out, interpretation
stands between description—e.g., paraphrase of individual sentences,
where meanings are readily enough agreed upon—and appreciation or
felt engagement with values (p. 29). For example, in interpreting, “we
must judge whether the characters in The Sun Also Rises morally develop
by explaining for maximal appreciation the descriptions of their actions
and thoughts in the text, whatever interpretation of their descriptions
along these lines (if any) was intended by Hemingway” (p. 33).
Given the further assumptions that “artworks can be appreciated in
different ways” and may “have potential values that cannot be realized
simultaneously” (p. 38), then a third thesis immediately follows from
this picture of interpretation:
3) “There will be incompatible interpretations or explanations [of the
achievement of literary aesthetic value in a work] that appeal to different tastes or preferences for different aesthetic values” (p. 38).

Notably, Goldman treats aesthetic value not as a function of any more
or less immediately discernible single property but rather as a complex
configurational feature of works. A novel possesses aesthetic value and
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displays that value to readers when and only when readers are absorbed
in their attentions to a considerable range of complex interrelated
semantic, formal, thematic, historical, and intertextual features, among
others, in following what is going on.
This general picture of appreciation and interpretation that is
developed in part 1 of Philosophy and the Novel strikes me as quite rightminded; in particular it strikes me as apt and useful in casting light on
the importance of close reading that is fully attentive to the complexities
of novels in order to engage with their value. I do, however, want to
raise two questions about this picture—one about intention, and one
about the object of appreciation—that might complicate it somewhat
by pointing to how authors and readers alike do their work in writing
and reading as agents within a complex historico-semantic field.
In general, it is well to remember both that actions are typically
overdetermined by multiple intentions and that an intention is best
regarded as a plan in execution, quite frequently one that is attributed
retrospectively in cases in which an action has failed to come off well.
To illustrate each of these points: What are my intentions in producing
and presenting this set of comments? There are many: to do justice
to a significant book, to advance my own thinking about the issues it
considers, to forward my own reputation, to convey enough material of
interest so that some will want to have a beer after the session to talk
about it further, and so on.
Some of these intentions may be explicitly formulated in my consciousness; some may not be. Most are such that I would be able to
acknowledge them if they were formulated and put to me, but not necessarily all are. I might be so vain about my modesty that I am unable to
recognize my own vanity in speaking. Second, we are particularly likely
to make claims about what was intended in cases in which something
has gone wrong. For example: “Eldridge completely misunderstood the
book, but he was intending to get it right.”
Both these points—the overdetermination of action by intention and
the frequent role of intention formulations in retrospective explanations
of misfire—suggest that having and acting on intentions in general is
not simply a matter of having some single and simple plan formulated
in mind either prior to or after action. Goldman is right to criticize
forms of intentionalism about interpretation such as that of E. D. Hirsch,
for whom the meaning of a literary work pretty much is the sum of a
number of explicitly formulated writer intentions that determine each
of its sentences one by one, with the meaning of the work then being
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nothing more than their concatenation. But it also seems to me right
to say that the novel is itself a quite complexly intended object; when
we are interpreting it we are redescribing it as the result of a complex
plan that it both makes sense to attribute to the author and that is
worked out in detail in the work. So there is a sense in which whenever
we are interpreting a work we are attending to its author’s embodied
intentions, though we are of course not at all obliged to take authors’
prior or subsequent obiter dicta about what they were doing in their
works as dispositive.
I note that Garry Hagberg made this point elegantly in his insightful
review of Philosophy and the Novel in citing Ornette Coleman to the effect
that no matter what anyone was or was not consciously verbalizing in
improvising in a jazz performance, what comes out pretty clearly falls
“within the range of the idea.” I am not sure that Goldman disagrees
with any of this in criticizing the Hirschean form of intentionalism that
he rightly rejects, but it seems worthwhile to note that, given the nature
of intention, there is a reasonable picture of what we do in interpreting
that might be called plausible reconstructionism about not necessarily
explicit or acknowledged actualized intentionalism.
In a way, the question I want to raise about appreciation is similar.
Goldman observes that “the fundamental purpose of interpretation itself
[is] to guide perception toward maximal appreciation and therefore
fair evaluation of a work” (p. 41). In one sense this is surely right: close
reading that endeavors to track what is accomplished (or bungled) in
the detailed construction of the work is a central moment of critical
understanding. But there is, I think, an issue about what is inside the
work and what is outside it. That is, the boundaries are not always so clear.
Consider Wordsworth’s attitude toward his sister Dorothy at the end
of “Tintern Abbey.” He treats her there as frozen, as it were, in nature
and immaturity, and as thereby able to confirm for him, in her enthusiasm for his work, his own sanity and continuing connection to nature,
despite the potentially apocalyptic and world-denying power of his poetic
imagination. His attitude toward Dorothy is there in the poem. It is an
aspect of Wordsworth’s actualized range of complex intentions. But is
it only in Wordsworth? Or is it also one version of an attitude toward
women and their proper role in life that was in general circulation in
English culture around 1800? I think the answer has to be that it is in
both Wordsworth and the general culture. So when we read Wordsworth,
we are also frequently reading the preoccupations of the culture as
filtered through his complex agency.
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Likewise, of course, for novels. Consider Hemingway’s attitudes toward
masculinity. In fact, nowadays, for a variety of reasons having to do
with suspicion of the very ideas of aesthetic value and literary achievement, working literary scholars are on the whole more likely to dwell
on expressed cultural attitudes than on configurations that support
absorbed, enchanted reading. I think it is arguable that contemporary
literary scholarship goes too far in this and that it scants too much
the imagination and creative power of the author to see and render
things anew. But Goldman’s talk of appreciation sometimes seems to
me to go too far the other way, in relying on a conception of aesthetic
value as determined by complex configurations that invite and sustain
the full involvement of individual readers, without noting sufficiently
that both readers and writers are also occupying stances—sometimes
complacently, sometimes critically—within wider fields of attitudes in
circulation in a culture.
As with the first point, I am also not sure quite how much we disagree
about this. I, too, think that complex configurations that invite and sustain absorbed engagement are central to literary art and that we need
to distinguish between configurations that heighten our attentions to a
work’s subject matters and those that are, on the other hand, clichéd or
merely typical within a culture. But it seems to me that the configurations that we can and should in some sense appreciate are wider and
more complex than involving elements simply inside the work, and that
our stance in alert interpretation may often rightly mix appreciation
and suspicion. To join this to my first question: perhaps the real focus
of our interest in interpreting is not the work and its configurations
alone, but the work’s configurations as embodiments of the author’s
complex working through of frequently shared ambivalences in attitude,
understanding, and feeling in relation to the subject matter of the work.
Part 2 of the book, titled “Philosophy in Novels,” focuses on various
phenomena of moral development as these phenomena are presented
in novels. The central cases are Pride and Prejudice, Huckleberry Finn,
The Cider House Rules, and Nostromo. Perhaps the most important idea
is that mature moral judgment and action require all of reason-guided
perception, volitional commitment, and emotional involvement (p.
112). Hence, reading a person or a situation is like reading a novel in
inviting and requiring complex engagement that is all at once cognitive,
perceptual, imaginative, and emotional.
Jane Austen understood all that, and she presents Darcy and
Elizabeth as arriving at moral maturity through complex mechanisms
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of development that involve each dimension of engagement (p. 133).
Having myself written on moral development in Pride and Prejudice at
length—work that Goldman generously footnotes—and in particular
focusing on the parallel between apt reading of novels and apt reading
of character that is developed within the novel, I find nothing at all to
disagree with in this line of thought. We should reject a priorism in
moral theory, and we should take seriously the picture of development
in moral understanding from initial immaturity, egoism, and errancy to
moral maturity, as Jane Austen presents it in all its dimensions.
Huckleberry Finn presents a trickier case. Here Goldman’s main point
with respect to standard moral theory is that moral motivation is not a
requirement of rationality (p. 138). This has, and I think it is intended
by Goldman to have, an anti-Kantian ring. The argument for this
claim is that Huck is rational (he thinks clearly and argues things out,
understands situations, and so forth) but is not motivated by the moral
requirement to turn Jim in to the authorities. So rationality without
moral motivation is possible. Here I found myself objecting that turning in Jim is not a genuine moral requirement, but rather a corrupt
and bogus requirement that was generally (but not universally) held
within a slave-holding society. Goldman considers this objection, and
he replies to it by claiming that Huck fully accepts this corrupt social
morality but is rational, so we have, again, a case of rationality without
moral motivation.
But this reply misses, I think, the force of the objection. Those who
do hold that moral motivation is a requirement of rationality—most
prominently, many Kantians—hold that the requirement is a normative
one, not a matter of factual necessity. That is, one is, according to Kant,
rationally required in virtue of a command of pure practical reason to
have certain normative commitments and motivations, no matter what
the corrupt ways of the world may be. In fact, as Goldman also sees,
Huck’s various emotions about Jim and the authorities evince a less-thanwholehearted acceptance of that corrupt social morality, so that Huck
is in part responding via his emotional life to a genuine, noncorrupt,
moral requirement of respect for the humanity of another. Therefore
the novel contains at least a thread of the idea of a general normative
requirement of respect for persons along Kantian lines.
Against this thought, Goldman argues, further, that Huck is not
practically irrational, where practical irrationality is understood as
requiring self-defeat or a breakdown of any sustainable sense of what
one is doing and ought to do (p. 152). Huck, while incoherent in
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professing support for the official corrupt morality and yet feeling as
he does, does not suffer from self-defeat or a complete breakdown. So
he is, again, practically rational enough, but not consistently morally
motivated either way. Here I think it would be better to say that Huck
is not fully practically rational, in particular that he is not consistently
practically rational in all his thoughts and pronouncements according
to the normative standard of full practical rationality that is set by the
categorical imperative. So Goldman’s argument fails, I think, to touch
the sense in which Kantians hold that moral motivation is a normative
requirement of consistent practical rationality.
Both the chapter on The Cider House Rules and the chapter on Nostromo
focus on the topic of “what is generally necessary for sustaining a strong
moral identity [and moral] motivation” (p. 158). The core thought is that
“the health and very survival of the self [are] subject to factors beyond
one’s control” (p. 182). This is because “an integrated self is necessary
for a sense of meaning in life, meaning deriving from the coherence
over time of events under one’s control” (p. 185). One possesses such
an integrated self when and only when “action seems self-directed,
expressive of one’s character, and under one’s control, achieving the
values pursued, and leading to fresh intentions and plans” (p. 158).
But whether all that is the case depends on what others do and find
intelligible or unintelligible within one’s shared social space. If things
are as they are in Nostromo in particular, where “all [are] victims of circumstantial moral luck, [where] they betray society as society betrays
them]” (p. 197), and where “all personal relations among these characters fail: none is open, intimate, and successful [and] none has his
identity confirmed in another” (p. 198), then the very possibilities of
moral identity and integrated selfhood are corrupted and no longer
accessible.
There can be little doubt, I think, that Conrad’s depiction of a social
world in South America under the thumb of imperialism is unremittingly bleak and that the consequences of this bleakness are exactly
what Goldman says they are. To return, however, to a thought about the
author, I nonetheless wonder whether Nostromo is best read in its social
realism as entirely a counsel of despair. In particular, are we not also
aware of Conrad’s own fullness of attention to the social phenomena
he describes, and do we not ourselves identify with that heightened
authorial attentiveness? Conrad’s formal and thematic achievement
function, I suggest, despite the bleakness of its subject matter and plot,
as themselves a kind of symbol of and placeholder for life otherwise.
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In turn this suggests—as, among others, Joshua Landy has recently
argued (in How to Do Things with Fictions, 2012)—a role in the formation of character for the reading experience itself. No doubt its role
is not so great as to overcome on its own the forces of corrupt social
circumstances of reading, let alone of forces due to the presence in
one’s life of actual others, especially parents and friends. But then it is
not nothing, either.
To pull my three critical thoughts together, perhaps there is yet more
to be said in favor of the importance of authorial stances, involving
mixtures of heightened attentiveness and horror, achieved through and
embodied in densely textured webs of words, as themselves objects of
readerly engagement, and for mixtures of appreciation and suspicion
within interpretation, than is quite said in this eminently humane, rightminded, careful, and imaginative book.
Swarthmore College

1. Alan H. Goldman, Philosophy and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);
hereafter cited by page numbers.

